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CONSTRUCTION LAW
Robert L. Meyers III*
Michael D. Cuda * *
T HIS Article covers construction law issues decided between Septem-
ber 1990 and September 1991. During this period, the Texas legisla-
ture enacted no significant construction law legislation. Nevertheless,
the courts rendered a number of interesting decisions. Two Texas supreme,
court decisions relating to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act are of particu-
lar interest.' One case is more interesting, and potentially more significant,
due to the court's failure to rule rather than its ruling on the issues. 2 This
Article discusses cases from Texas, from the Fifth Circuit and from out-of-
state courts which may impact Texas construction law.
I. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
In Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper3 the court considered whether a jury find-
ing that allowed an offset for defects on a construction contract amounted to
a finding of actual damages in a Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)4
claim, thereby allowing an award of attorneys' fees. The court held that
well-established construction contract law deems that the cost to remedy
defects is a measure of damages for a breach of contract, not an award of
DTPA damages. 5 The party seeking an award of DTPA damages must ob-
tain a jury finding of actual damages under the DTPA in order to be entitled
to attorneys' fees6. Consequently, the request for attorneys' fees was denied.
The Culpepper court also reversed a judgment n.o.v. after a jury finding
that John C. Culpepper, Jr. and Culpepper Properties, Inc. were alter egos of
one another. 7 The evidence that the court found determinative included the
facts that the construction loan was executed in both the corporation's and
the individual's name; the loan was personally guaranteed by the individual;
John Culpepper had informed the construction contractor that he was per-
sonally behind the project (which was confirmed by the mortgage lender);
* B.A. Southern Methodist University; L.L.B. Southern Methodist University School of
Law; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A. University of Dallas; M.B.A. St. Edward's University; J.D. Texas Tech Univer-
sity School of Law; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dallas, Texas.
1. See infra notes 3 & 6 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
3. 802 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht, Phillips, J. dissenting).
4. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
5. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d at 231; Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio,
Inc., 677 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1984).
6. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d at 231.
7. Id. at 227.
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and strict corporate formalities were not followed in regard to checking ac-
counts and signatures on notes.8 Therefore, the case was remanded to the
lower court to evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the jury
finding.9
Probably the most significant DTPA supreme court decision related to
construction law this year is found in White Budd Van Ness v. Major-Gladys
Drive.10 This case involved the DTPA's application to architectural negli-
gence. In White Budd an architect's plans and specifications required a con-
tractor to install stamped concrete in a new shopping center. The contractor
later claimed he could not install the stamped concrete and proposed the
installation of "C-Tile." The proposal was reviewed and approved by the
project architect. When the C-Tile proved unsuitable after installation, the
joint venture sued both the contractor and architect. However, the contrac-
tor settled with the joint venture for a nominal amount and signed a "Mary
Carter" agreement. The suit against the architect included allegations of
DTPA violations and breach of the implied warranty of good and workman-
like performance established in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v.
Barnes. "
The jury found against the architect on all claims, including knowing vio-
lations of the DTPA, and the Melody Homes implied warranty issue.12 The
verdict was based in part on testimony regarding the architectural standard
of care from an expert who was not an architect or a licensed engineer, but
had a civil engineering degree.13 The court of appeals affirmed the jury deci-
sion.14 The architect's Writ of Error to the Texas supreme court was dis-
missed because counsel would not comply with the 50 page brief limit.' 5
Therefore, at least until this issue is considered directly by the supreme
court, there is precedent holding that a professional architect may be held
liable for failure to provide services in a good and workmanlike manner
under the Melody Homes doctrine, and that an individual who has a civil
engineering degree, but is not a licensed engineer, can testify as an expert on
the standard of care for architects.
In Oxford Finance Companies, Inc. v. Velez' 6 the court considered a case
in which the plaintiff contracted to have aluminum siding installed on her
home. The contract and mechanics and materialman's lien were subse-
quently assigned to Oxford Finance Companies, the permanent lender.
When it was discovered that the siding was improperly installed, Ms. Velez
discontinued payments to Oxford. Oxford subsequently foreclosed on the
property and sold it to a third party. The third party attempted to take
8. Id. at 229.
9. Id. at 231.
10. 798 S.W.805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990), writ dism'd per curiam, 811 S.W.2d 541
(Tex. 1991).
11. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
12. White Budd, 798 S.W.2d at 808-09.
13. Id. at 815.
14. Id. at 820.
15. 811 S.W.2d 341 (Tex 1991).
16. 807 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
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possession of the house, and this action was filed for violations of the DTPA
and the Home Solicitation Transactions Act (HSTA). 17 Ms. Velez prevailed
under both the DTPA and the HSTA claims, thus voiding the deed of trust
lien, and foreclosure sale. Ms. Velez was awarded $7,800.00 in damages and
$25,000.00 in attorneys' fees. Oxford appealed the DTPA violation verdict
and claimed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) notice precluded any af-
firmative relief, or alternatively, precluded any liability in excess of the total
amount of payments made to Oxford by Ms. Velez.' 8
Oxford relied on an official comment to the FTC's notice language to ar-
gue that affirmative relief was inappropriate. ' 9 The comment suggests that a
consumer will not be allowed to affirmatively recover against an assignee of a
contract unless the consumer received little or no value from the seller.2 0
The court rejected the argument and relied on the clear and unambiguous
language of the FTC contractual provision which states that a holder of the
contract is subject to all claims and defenses which a debtor may assert
against a seller.2 1
The court next considered Oxford's claim that Ms. Velez was not entitled
to recover an amount in excess of the payments she made to Oxford under
the consumer contract. Here, the court agreed with Oxford's contention,
relying on Home Savings Association v. Guerra.22 In Guerra the supreme
court reasoned that if an assignee were held liable for all losses under a con-
tract incurred by the seller, the assignee would become a guarantor of the
contract. 23 The court reasoned that this was not intended by Congress when
it passed the statute requiring the FTC notice. 24 Consequently, the recovery
against Oxford was limited to the amount paid under the contract. 25 The
court also relied on Guerra for the proposition that attorneys' fees are prop-
erly divisible on a pro rata basis between an assignee of a FTC contract and a
seller in a breach of contract case. 26
The court considered procedural aspects of the DTPA in Miller v. Kos-
sey.27 In Miller a homeowner brought a DTPA claim against contractors
who were hired to construct additions and improvements to her house. The
contractors breached the contract in 1984 and the homeowner sent written
notice of her complaints, the damages, the expenses, and her anticipated at-
torneys' fees. Her damages were based on breach of contract, breach of war-
ranty, and violations of the DTPA, but she did not specifically reference
which sections of the DTPA had been violated. Under the notice provision
of the DTPA in effect at the time the claim arose, the homeowner was re-
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-13.01 to -13.07 (Vernon 1987).
18. Oxford Finance, 807 S.W.2d at 463.
19. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1990).
20. Id.
21. Oxford Finance, 807 S.W.2d at 463.
22. 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987).
23. Id. at 136.
24. Id.
25. Oxford Finance, 807 S.W.2d at 464.
26. Id.
27. 802 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
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quired to provide at least 30 days notice of the specific violations prior to
filing suit. In this case however, counsel for both parties agreed in open
court in September 1988 that the notice given in 1984 under the Act was
inadequate. Therefore, the court ordered that new notice be sent to the de-
fendants. 28 Additionally, the court order made clear that both parties were
required to be ready for trial later that month. After six months, the plaintiff
had not sent notice in compliance with the court's order. Consequently, the
defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction and made a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's suit.29
The court began its analysis by noting that proper notice under the Act is
a necessary element in a plaintiff's DTPA action. 30 In this case, the plaintiff
agreed through her counsel in 1988 that the notice provided in 1984 was
inadequate. Additionally, the court ordered appropriate notice to be given
to the defendant in 1988. The plaintiff failed to comply with that order, and
therefore dismissal of the DTPA claims was appropriate. Upon this ruling
from the bench, the plaintiff announced that she was not willing to go for-
ward with any of the additional claims at that time. Consequently, the court
dismissed the balance of her claims. 31 The court held that dismissal was
appropriate as an exercise of the court's fundamental power to dismiss a
claim when a party refuses to prosecute it.32 In this case, the dismissal fol-
lowed the plaintiff's announcement of ready for trial, the selection of a jury,
and refusal to prosecute the actions after her DTPA claims were dis-
missed.33 Therefore, the judgment of the trial court for dismissal was
affirmed. 34
II. ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS
Architects and engineers were probably most affected by the cases in con-
struction law this year. While this section contains a limited number of
cases, architecture and engineering cases are sprinkled throughout the Arti-
cle in other sections. This distribution was necessary in that, although archi-
tects and engineers were defendants in the cases, the legal principles
established may apply to other classes of defendants.
Jefferson Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Adams 35 involved a dispute between an
architectural and engineering firm (A&E Firm) and a savings and loan. In
this case, the A&E firm sued Gates Development Corporation (Gates) for
failure to pay for services rendered. The judgment was granted in 1987.
Subsequently, Jefferson Savings & Loan (S&L) sought to collect on a prom-
issory note executed by Gates, such note being secured by an apartment
28. Id. at 875.
29. Id.
30. Cielo Dorado Dev. v. Certainteed Corp., 744 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting).
31. Miller, 802 S.W.2d at 876.
32. Id. at 877.
33. Id. at 875.
34. Id. at 877.
35. 802 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
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complex. In conjunction with that effort, the S&L obtained a temporary
injunction that prevented the A&E firm from executing on the apartments to
satisfy their judgment. The terms of the injunction required all rents, profits
and revenues from the apartment complex to be paid into a third party bank
account. The A&E firm then filed a garnishment action against the bank.
The trial court ruled in favor of the A&E firm relying in part on the fact that
Texas is a mortgage lien theory state and therefore, the owner of the prop-
erty (Gates) is the owner of the rents.36 The trial decision was reversed be-
cause the garnishment action was an attempted collateral attack on a
temporary injunction. 37 The court reasoned that a collateral attack on a
judgment may only be maintained if the judgment is absolutely void. 38
Therefore, the S&L was allowed to retain possession of the funds.
III. MUNICIPALITIES
Another garnishment issue was raised in City of Victoria v. Hoffman. 39 In
this case, a subcontractor (Hoffman) sought to enforce a judgment against a
general contractor for services performed on a municipal contract. Hoffman
was unable to locate any assets to satisfy the judgment, other than a poten-
tial receivable owed to the contractor from the City of Victoria. The City's
initial response to the garnishment stated that it did not owe the contractor
any funds. The City subsequently entered into an agreed judgment to pay
the contractor a total of $10,000, paid the funds to the contractor, and then
amended its answer to the garnishment and claimed statutory sovereign im-
munity from garnishment.4° The trial court found that the City's failure to
amend the response to the garnishment prior to paying the contractor served
as a waiver of sovereign immunity.41
The appellate court initially commented that waiver is an intentional re-
linquishment of a known right.42 In this case, the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure determine whether or not the City waived its defense. Rule 94
requires that an affirmative defense be pleaded, and a failure to plead the
defense results in a waiver.43 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that rule 94
must be read in conjunction with rule 63, which allows amendment of plead-
ings until seven days before trial.44 Here, although the City paid the con-
tractor the funds before amending the pleadings, the pleadings were
amended more than seven days before trial. Therefore, the affirmative de-
fense of sovereign immunity was not waived and the City prevailed in the
action.45
36. Id. at 812.
37. Id. at 814.
38. Id.
39. 809 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
40. See TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 101.023 (Vernon 1988).
41. City of Victoria, 809 S.W.2d at 604.
42. Id. at 605.
43. Id. (citing Bracton Corp. v. Evans Construction Co., 784 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).




Another municipality faced similar problems in Corpus Christi v.
Heldenfels Brothers.4 In this case, a subcontractor (Heldenfels) sued the
City for recovery under theories of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and
negligent failure of the City to require the contractor to provide a proper
payment bond under the McGregor Act.47 The City contracted with La-
Mann Constructors Inc., as general contractor to make improvements to
park land and a recreation center. Before completion the contractor aban-
doned the project without paying Heldenfels and it was discovered that the
performance and payment bonds were fraudulent documents involving a
nonexistent bonding company. Heldenfels sued the City for $26,000, which
represented the cost of the T-beams supporting the roof to the recreation
center. The jury's verdict favored the subcontractor on all issues.
The court of appeals reversed the jury's decision. The court disposed of
the quantum meruit finding on a factual insufficiency point by focusing on
the required element that the contractor notify the party to be charged that
they expect payment for services performed from that party.48 The only
testimony regarding Heldenfels' notification of the City adduced at trial
came from their attorney and from the party who prepared their price and
cost estimate on the project. Their attorney testified that "he would be
greatly surprised" if the City was not aware that Heldenfels expected pay-
ment from it.49 The party who prepared Heldenfels' cost and price estimate
stated that because the City had used and enjoyed the T-beams in question,
"under such circumstances as Heldenfels Brothers reasonably notified the
City that they expected the City to pay for that work."' 50 The court found
this evidence so weak that it did not amount to more than a scintilla of
evidence. 5' Therefore, the City's factual insufficiency point on quantum me-
ruit was sustained.5 2
The court next disposed of Heldenfels' unjust enrichment claim. While it
agreed that the City gained at least incidental benefits from the provision of
the T-beams, the Court held that the City was under no contractual obliga-
tion to make payment to a subcontractor who was not a party to the separate
general contract.53 Therefore, recovery under this theory was improper.
Finally, the court disposed, of the claim for negligent failure to require a
general contractor to provide a proper payment bond. The version of the
McGregor Act in effect when the action arose54 did not impose liability for
breach of the responsibility to require a valid payment bond by a contractor.
Although the Act was subsequently amended specifically to provide liability
against a governmental entity for failure to secure a proper payment bond on
46. 802 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ granted).
47. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992).





53. Id. at 41.
54. Act of June 16, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 809, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2027, amended
by Act of June 18, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1138, § 38, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4703, 4704.
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a contract, the statute in effect at the time the action arose did not impose
liability on the municipality. Therefore, the jury's decision on this issue was
reversed as a matter of law. 55 Nevertheless, writ has been granted by the
supreme court56 and while any one of these reversals may be changed, the
supreme court is likely to correct the court of appeals' rendition of the quan-
tum meruit factual insufficiency point of error. Remand is the appropriate
disposition of a factual insufficiency point.57
IV. EXPRESS NEGLIGENCE
Municipalities and the application of the express negligence rule were con-
sidered by the court in at least two recent decisions. In City of Houston v.
Goings 58 Snead Site Preparation was hired to demolish a hybrid suspension
bridge. Although the bridge appeared to be supported by the piers below it,
most of its weight was supported by a series of basketwork trusses. Snead
did not have any previous experience dismantling bridges. The trusses sup-
porting the center section were removed without incident because the bridge
was counterbalanced. However, when the trusses in the south section of the
bridge were cut, the steel began "ripping like paper" and the plaintiff was
injured. 59 The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff on all issues, and found the
City 100% negligent. Among the City's issues on appeal was a claim that
the contract specifically indemnified the City for its own negligence in ac-
cord with Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction. 60
The court of appeals reviewed the pertinent contractual clauses to deter-
mine whether the City had been indemnified for its own negligence. 61 While
there were a number of clauses assigning the risk of loss to the contractor, all
the clauses were specifically referable to the contractor's own negligence.
Because the contractor's employee was found non-negligent by the jury, no
damages could be assessed against the contractor. 62 The court also held that
the City was not entitled to comparative indemnity because it did not meet
the requirements of the express negligence test.63
Another case involving municipalities analyzed the procedural issue of
which party has the burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment
when the express negligence doctrine for indemnification agreements is in-
volved. In R. L. Jones Co. v. San Antonio" Jones and the City of San
Antonio were sued by a party who was injured when she drove her car into a
trench dug by Jones for the purpose of lowering a gas pipeline. The contract
between Jones and the City had an indemnification clause, but it did not
55. Heldenfels, 802 S.W.2d at 41.
56. Heldenfels Brothers v. Corpus Christi, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 515 (April 10, 1991).
57. See TEX. R. App. P. 81(c).
58. 795 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
59. Id. at 832.
60. 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
61. Going, 795 S.W.2d at 835.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 809 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
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contain express language indemnifying the City for its own negligence as
required by Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co. 65 Therefore, the City of
San Antonio would be liable under the contract for its own negligence. In
this case, Jones severed the suit against the City from the original action by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff received a take-nothing judgment against Jones
based on a jury finding that the plaintiff was 80% negligent and Jones was
20% negligent. Subsequently, the City settled with the plaintiff for $2,000
and sought to recover the funds plus attorneys' fees and expenses from Jones
pursuant to the indemnification clause. Both parties moved for summary
judgment.
The court of appeals determined that an indemnitee (the City) that makes
a motion for summary judgment under an indemnification clause that does
not comply with Ethyl must prove as a matter of law that it was not negli-
gent. 66 In this case, the court reviewed the motions for summary judgment
and found that the City did not conclusively show that it was not negli-
gent. 67 Additionally, it found that because Jones did not expressly plead in
its motion that the City was negligent, summary judgment was not proper in
Jones' favor. 68 Therefore, the denial of Jones' summary judgment was af-
firmed, and the summary judgment in favor of the City was reversed and
remanded. 6 9
Another application of the express negligence rule to the burden of proof
in pleading appeared in R. B. Tractors, Inc. v. Mann.70 Mann leased a trac-
tor and signed a contract in which he assumed liability for all losses and
damage to the equipment. The tractor was hitched to Mann's trailer by the
lessor and during transportation, the tractor fell off the trailer and suffered
damage. R. B. Tractors sued for breach of contract to recover repair ex-
penses. The jury found that Mann was not negligent. Therefore, the trial
court entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Mann. 7'
The court of appeals reversed the decision on the ground that although
the indemnification clause did not comply with the Ethyl express negligence
requirement, Mann was still required to plead, prove, and obtain a jury in-
struction on the indemnitee's negligence because contributory negligence is
an affirmative defense. 72 Mann did not obtain a jury instruction on the issue
and therefore, he was required to pay for the tractor damage.
The burden of proof in a contractual indemnification clause was also
raised in Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Goldston Corp..73 Champlin executed a
facility maintenance contract with Goldston that contained an indemnifica-
tion clause in Champlin's favor. A Goldston employee was injured on the
65. 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
66. R.L. Jones, 809 S.W.2d at 568 (citing, Sira & Payne, Inc. v. Wallace & Riddle, 484
S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1972).
67. R.L. Jones, 809 S.W.2d at 569.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 800 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 957-58.
73. 797 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
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job. Champlin settled with the employee and sought indemnity from Gold-
ston. Goldston claimed that because the clause did not meet the express
negligence requirements, indemnification was improper.
Champlin did not argue that the clause met the express negligence rule,
but rather that the rule was inapplicable in this case. The express negligence
rule is used to determine whether a negligent party will be indemnified for its
own negligence. 74 In this case, Champlin was never found to be negligent
and the stipulated facts did not establish or support a negligence finding
against Champlin. 5 Because Goldston did not meet its burden of proof as a
matter of law, the trial court decision was reversed and rendered.76
In Olson v. Central Power and Light77 the court discussed whether the
express negligence rule applies to statutory as opposed to contractual indem-
nity. Kermit Olson, d/b/a Olson Plastering Company, was hired to aid in
the construction of an office building. While working on the building, one of
Olson's employees, Smith, came in contact with a power line and was in-
jured. Because Olson carried Workers' Compensation Insurance, it claimed
to be indemnified from any and all liability.78 While it is clear under the
Workers' Compensation Act that Smith could not sue Olson, the initial issue
in this case was whether Central Power and Light could sue Olson for in-
demnification for Smith's injuries under the Texas Public Utilities Act.7 9
The court began by stating that whether one statute takes priority over
another is an issue to be decided by the court as a matter of law.80 The court
then noted statutory construction rules dictate that when statutes are in ir-
reconcilable conflict, the more specific statute or the later enacted statute is
deemed to control.8 ' In this case, the Texas Utilities Act met both tests.
The court then turned to the express negligence rule. According to the
court, the rule was developed "to defeat crafty scriveners who create ambig-
uous indemnity contracts in an effort to deceive the indemnitor. ' '8 2 This
concern does not exist in statutory indemnification cases.83 Based on these
findings, Central Power and Light was indemnified from any liability to
Smith for his injuries.
Another indemnification case involved an architect's attempt to enforce
an indemnity agreement against a contractor to recover the cost of defending
a suit filed by a property owner against both the contractor and the archi-
tect. In this case, the contractor and a third party were found to be negli-
gent, but not the architect. In Foster, Henry, Henry & Thorpe, Inc. v. J. T
74. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
75. Champlin Petroleum, 797 S.W.2d at 166.
76. Id. at 167.
77. 803 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
78. Act of March 28, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 269, repealed
by Act of Nov. 14, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(7)-(9), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws.
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1436c, § 7(b) (Vernon 1980) (repealed 1989) (cur-
rent version at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 752.008 (Vernon Pamph. 1991)).
80. Olsen, 803 S.W.2d at 811.
81. Id.




Construction Co.,84 an architectural firm entered into a contract to provide
plans and specifications for the construction of the El Paso Rehabilitation
Center. The arrangement with the contractor included an indemnification
clause that stated that the owner of the property and the architect and their
agents and employees were indemnified from any claims, expenses including
attorneys' fees, and losses for any claim "attributable to .. .injury to or
destruction of tangible property" that "is caused in whole or in part by a
negligent act or omission of the Contractor.""5 The negligent acts consid-
ered in this case caused damage to property adjacent to the construction site
when a substantial rainfall caused flooding, allegedly due to the contractor's
failure to protect the site. The trial court directed a verdict that the archi-
tects take nothing on their indemnification claim.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the lower court decision, first
noting that the indemnification agreement did not seek to indemnify the ar-
chitects for their negligence.86 In fact, the jury found that the architects
were not negligent.87 The court next considered the contractor's argument
that recent statutory changes 88 making indemnity clauses in favor of archi-
tects void and unenforceable applied in this case. Here, the court held that
the statutory changes were expressly referable to indemnification for an ar-
chitect's negligence.89 Although the court ruled in favor of the architects,
the case was remanded because the trial court excluded the architectural
firm's evidence of expenses and attorneys' fees associated with the
litigation.90
An interesting decision was reached in a California case involving the con-
struction and applicability of its anti-indemnity statute. In Markborough
California, Inc. v. Superior Court9l Markborough, a developer, entered into
a contract with an engineering firm (Glenn) that specialized in man-made
lake design. The contract included a clause, one of thirty-three paragraphs
in fine print on the reverse side of the contract, that limited Glenn's liability
to Markborough for negligent acts to the greater of $50,000 or the engineer-
ing services fee. When the lake liner failed, Markborough incurred over $5
million in expenses to repair the problem. Glenn asserted the limitation of
liability clause to cap its exposure on the project at $67,640.
The California anti-indemnification statute provides that a construction
contract agreement that attempts to indemnify a party for loss due to its
negligence or wilful misconduct is void as against public policy. 92 The stat-
ute, however, provides that parties may negotiate and expressly agree to re-
duce or limit their liability between themselves. 93 The court ruled that the
84. 808 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
85. Id. at 140.
86. Id. at 141.
87. Id.
88. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 130.002 (Vernon 1991).
89. Foster, 808 S.W.2d at 141.
90. Id.
91. 277 Cal. Rptr. 919, 227 Cal. App. 3d 705 (1991).
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782 (West 1974).
93. Id. § 2782.5.
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agreement between Markborough and Glenn fell outside the anti-indemnifi-
cation clause. 94 According to the court, negotiating merely requires "a fair
opportunity to accept, reject or modify a liability limitation provision"9 5 and
the agreement only operated to limit liability between the parties.96 There-
fore, Markborough was left with virtually no recourse against Glenn except
recovery of the $67,640 fee.
V. CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
Amazingly, the courts had the opportunity to review an unambiguous
construction contract this year. In Sage Street Ass'n v. Northdale Construc-
tion Co. 97 the court addressed a breach of contract issue between an owner
and general contractor. In this case, an unambiguous construction contract
provided for installment payments to the contractor as the project
progressed, payment of the contractor's utility bills on the project, and pay-
ment for change orders. When the owner refused to pay change order ex-
penses and utility costs, the contractor walked off the project when it was
80% complete.
The court first noted that both sides agreed that the contract was unam-
biguous. 98 Therefore, the issues were decided as a matter of law. 99 The
court then found that the contract provided for progress installment pay-
ments that included both utility expenses and change orders. 1° ° The owner
failed to make those payments in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Therefore, the owner breached the contract and the contractor was excused
from performance.10 1 The contractor was also entitled to recover damages
that would place him in the same position as if there had been no contractual
breach because the owner breached the contract.102 Damages may include
profits that a contractor would have made if permitted to fully perform the
contract.10 3 Additionally, because the owner breached the contract and the
performance bond provided by the contractor contained express language
linking its obligation to pay under the bond to the owner's proper payment
under the contract, the bonding company was not required to make any
payments under the performance bond. 1° 4 Therefore, the trial court deci-
sion awarding the contractor in excess of $2.5 million plus prejudgment in-
terest was affirmed. The only change to the verdict was an adjustment to the
interest rate from 6% that was awarded at trial, to the 10% statutory
94. Markborough, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
95. Id. at 925.
96. Id. at 927.
97. 809 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ granted).
98. Id. at 777.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Fischer v. Richard Gill Co., 253 S.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio
1952, writ ref'd).
102. Sage Street, 809 S.W.2d at 777.
103. Id.





This year, there were a number of cases within the State, in the Fifth
Circuit, and from out of state that were of interest, but were not easily classi-
fied into one particular section of this article. The result is Erratica.
An interesting product liability issue was considered in Barham v. Turner
Construction Co. '06 Mr. Barham was the foreman of a subcontractor's crew
hired by Turner Construction to erect steel columns on a project. While
erecting a forty-foot steel column, a steel erection plate that was wired to the
top of the column fell and struck Barham, who was wearing a hardhat, on
the head. Barham sued Turner Construction and the steel column fabricator
for negligence and strict product liability. After a verdict against the steel
fabricator, Barham appealed the trial court's refusal to submit the product
liability theory of recovery against Turner to the jury.
The specific issue considered by the court in Barham related to whether
Turner, as contractor, was a seller "engaged in the business of selling" the
product (steel beams) for purposes of strict product liability.107 The court
initially noted that strict product liability does not necessarily require the
defendant to sell the product; however, the defendant "need only be engaged
in the business of introducing the product into channels of commerce."' 10 8
The court then reviewed the evidence and found that the steel fabricator sold
the columns used by Turner.'°9 Turner was merely a general contractor in
the business of selling services, not steel columns. Because Turner did not
introduce the columns into commerce, the trial court decision refusing to
submit the strict liability theory against Turner to the jury was upheld." 0
In Sur v. Otts, Inc. I I I the court considered a procedural issue relating to a
suit on sworn account to recover the cost of labor, materials and services
incurred renovating apartments damaged by Hurricane Alicia. The defend-
ant failed to deny the claim under oath as required by the rules of proce-
dure" 1 2 and consequently, the court ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff
was entitled to judgment.
The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial that was overruled. The
defendant then had ninety days from the date the judgment was signed to file
a cost bond and perfect an appeal in accordance with the rules of appellate
procedure.' " The defendant failed either to timely file the cost bond or to
request an extension of time to file the bond. However, the defendant
claimed that notice of the judgment was not received and knowledge of the
105. Id.
106. 803 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
108. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1978).
109. Barham, 803 S.W.2d at 738.
110. Id.
111. 800 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
113. TEx. R. APP. P. 41(a)(1).
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judgment was not acquired within twenty days of the date it was signed, as
required by the Rules. Hence, the defendant filed a motion1 14 in the trial
court after the initial appeal was dismissed in order to show that notice had
not been timely received. The appellate court dismissed her second appeal
because the lack of notice did not prevent her from filing a motion for new
trial, and therefore, her cost bond should have been timely filed.
115
In Criton Corp. v. Highlands Insurance Co. 116 a dispute arose between a
bridge contractor (Layton) and a subcontractor (Criton) that was to provide
pedestrian and automobile railing for the bridge. The dispute revolved
around which party was at fault when the bolting anchors and the guardrail
bolt holes did not match. Criton used an acetylene torch to cut additional
holes into the railing in an attempt to make the rails fit. The facts were in
conflict regarding whether Layton granted Criton the opportunity to make
repairs or whether Criton refused to acknowledge the problem. However, it
was undisputed that the Harris County inspector refused to certify the work
because of the burned holes.
Criton was ordered off the job because of the problem, and Layton re-
moved and replaced the existing guardrails. By performing the work itself,
Layton was able to complete the job for $5,800 less than the contract
amount. The savings were pled into the registry of the court. Layton
claimed the $5,800 was the only amount due on the contract. Criton filed
suit alleging breach of the subcontract and alternatively, an action in quan-
tum meruit. Layton claimed that Criton had breached the subcontract and
also requested an award of attorneys' fees under section 38.001 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Code). All issues were found in favor
of Layton and Criton appealed, claiming that Layton was not entitled to
attorneys' fees.
Criton's complaint revolved around which party was the prevailing party
in the action as well as the procedural requirements to satisfy in order to be
awarded attorneys' fees under the Code. The court first noted that the pre-
vailing party is the party who "successfully prosecutes the action or success-
fully defends against it.""17 The court then observed that when "a general
contractor recovers the amount necessary to complete a contract less the
amount that the general contractor retains, the general contractor is the pre-
vailing party entitled to attorney's fees."" 8 Therefore, Layton was entitled
to attorneys' fees.
The court also considered the procedural notice requirements of Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.002, and determined that Lay-
ton presented the claim to Criton prior to filing suit, even though the presen-
114. See TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(4).
115. Sur, 800 S.W.2d at 648.
116. 809 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
117. Id. at 357 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (4th ed.)).
118. Criton, 809 S.W. at 357 (citing Davis Masonry, Inc. v. B-F-W Const. Co., Inc., 622




tation was made orally. 1 9 Therefore, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed.
In Daniel International Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. 120 the court con-
sidered whether a liquidated damages clause, that entitled the contractor to
cost plus a 10% profit if a subcontractor was not able to complete the project
in a timely manner, was a contractual penalty provision. The dispute arose
over a contract to build a prison in Texas. Because the project was court
ordered, the completion date was inflexible and the subcontract made very
few provisions for delay. The contractor was allowed to step in and com-
plete the project in the event that a subcontractor was not performing in a
timely manner. The contractor was ultimately required to step in, and the
subcontractor was charged for the cost to complete the project as well as
liquidated damages amounting to an additional 10% of the cost. The dis-
trict court determined that the liquidated damages clause was a penalty pro-
vision and therefore refused to enforce it.' 2'
The court of appeals reviewed the criteria for determining whether a liqui-
dated damages clause operates as a penalty provision.1 22 The court must
determine first whether at the time the contract was let, the parties believed
that proof of loss would be difficult; and second, whether the amount fixed as
a liquidated damage is reasonable. 123 In this case, the court determined that
because it would be difficult to prove actual loss of profit suffered by the
contractor due to contingencies such as foregone profits, fixing a loss at the
time the contract was entered would be difficult.124 The court then relied on
other Fifth Circuit precedent indicating that a 10% profit was reasonable
and customary in contract work.' 2 5 Therefore, the liquidated damages
clause was not a penalty provision and was enforced.
In Nacol v. McNutt 126 the court considered whether a trustee acting on
behalf of the beneficiaries of the trust was personally liable on a construction
contract that was executed without a reservation of rights clause. In particu-
lar, the trustee complained that the jury issues placed the burden of proof on
the trustee to show that she had disclosed that she was acting in her capacity
as trustee, as opposed to putting the burden on the contractor to show that
she had concealed the fact that she was acting as the trustee. The court
found that it is well-settled law that a trustee bears personal liability for
contracts that she executes on behalf of the trust beneficiaries unless she
expressly stipulates to the contrary.127 Therefore, the decision of the lower
court was affirmed.
119. Criton, 809 S.W.2d at 358.
120. 916 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1990).
121. Id. at 1062.
122. Id. at 1066.
123. Id. at 1016 (citing Farmers Export Co. v. M/V Georgis Prois, 799 F.2d 159 (5th Cir.
1986)).
124. Daniel Int, 916 F.2d at 1066.
125. Id. at 1067.
126. 797 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
127. Id. at 155.
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In Texas-Capital Contractors, Inc. v. Abdnor 128 the court reviewed an ad-
ministrative law judge's determination that a contractor did not fit within
the Small Business Administration's (SBA) definition of a small business in
that it was affiliated with a number of other corporations held under com-
mon ownership and common management. The dispute in this case arose
when the Army Corps of Engineers awarded a small business set-aside to the
low bidder. The next lowest bidder challenged the award on the basis that
Michael McCarty, the sole stockholder, officer, and director of Texas-Capi-
tal Construction, Inc. (TCCI) was affiliated with a number of other compa-
nies. Due to the affiliation, the combined average annual receipts of all the
businesses exceeded the $17 million revenue limit placed on small businesses.
The corporations with which Michael McCarty was allegedly affiliated were
all owned or influenced by members of his family.
The SBA regional office initially determined that Michael was not affili-
ated with the companies. The SBA reasoned that Michael did not own stock
and was not a director of the other companies, and the family association did
not create an affiliation within the meaning of the SBA limitation. This deci-
sion was subsequently reviewed and it was determined that the corporations
all had an "identity of interest" and hence, were affiliated organizations.
This determination was challenged by Michael McCarty as arbitrary, capri-
cious, and not supported by the substantial evidence.
The court reviewed the identity of interest rule as it applies to family
members.1 29 Under the rule, an identity of interest among family members
is presumed in the absence of certain factors such as remoteness of family
ties, estrangement, or lack of close involvement in the business matters.1 30
The court then reviewed the specifics of the corporate relationships.
The court found that all of the corporations were initially established as
the McCarty Group by William McCarty.131 William was Michael's father.
William McCarty set up a series of trusts, all of which were related to the
construction business, for the benefit of his children. There was evidence
that the only reason Michael resigned his position in the McCarty Group
and sold his stock was to avoid a determination of affiliation by the SBA.
There was also evidence, however, that each of the corporations in the Mc-
Carty Group functioned as separate entities in that, although they were lo-
cated in the same building, each corporation was responsible for its own
expenses. While the court agreed that not one of these factors was determi-
native of whether TCCI controlled or was controlled by the McCarty
Group, there was evidence of a business relationship between the father and
the son.1 32 Based on these facts, the court would not overrule the adminis-
trative law judge's decision.' 33 Therefore, the determination that TCCI did
not fall within the category of a small business was upheld.
128. 933 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1990).
129. Id. at 266.
130. Id. at 266 (citing Size Appeal of Golden Bear Arborists, Inc., No. 1899 (1984)).
131. Texas-Capital, 933 F.2d at 267.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 269-70.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Legislative and judicial action during this past twelve months has not
brought any dramatic changes in the law affecting the construction industry,
except possibly some federal legislation such as the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act, which is beyond the purview of this article. What this year did
bring was a steady infiltration of the law applicable to particular aspects of
life into the world of construction. In addition, the year's activities highlight
the breadth of the field known as construction law. Indeed, to confidently
furnish the full range of legal services for the construction industry one must
be a truly "complete lawyer." Virtually every case reviewed for this con-
struction law update could have been and probably will be included in arti-
cles relating to a broad range of industry specialization areas as well as the
more traditional, academically-defined legal specialties. So now more than
ever before, "you people be careful out there."
